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Abstract 
 
Priming of pragmatic enrichment has been found in behavioural studies. We extend this by 
examining the neural correlates of priming for two implicature categories, quantifiers and 
disjunctions. Participants engaged in a primed sentence-picture matching task where they 
were presented with a sentence (e.g., “some of the letters are Bs”) followed by a picture. In 
prime trials the pictures were either consistent with an enriched interpretation (some but not 
all) or a basic interpretation (some and possibly all) of the sentence. The pictures in target 
trials were always consistent with the enriched interpretation. Using ERPs, we found a 
priming effect on the picture reflected in a reduced positivity for quantifiers when the 
preceding trial had an enriched interpretation, and no effect for disjunction. The pragmatic 
priming effect can be dissociated from expectation-based processes. It suggests that 
abstract derivation processes are primed during pragmatic alignment. 
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Introduction 
Speakers and listeners often repeat the same structures and expressions. For 
example, speakers are more likely to produce an active description of a picture, such as 
“lightning is striking the church” after hearing an active sentence “one of the fans punched 
the referee” than after a passive “the referee was punched by one of the fans” [1]. Such 
alignment between interlocutors confers advantages in terms of the predictability of the 
exchange and ultimately the ease with which people can communicate [2,3]. In the current 
research we investigate alignment of a different sort, pragmatic enrichment, using a 
phenomenon known as scalar implicatures [4,5], such as the enrichment that occurs from 
some to some but not all. Behavioural data on the processing of scalar implicatures shows 
evidence of priming [6,7] and in this study we use event-related potentials (ERPs) to better 
understand its underlying cause. 
Scalar implicatures are paradigmatic examples of pragmatic enrichments [4,5] that 
arise by considering what the speaker could have said, but didn’t. Consider the following 
examples:  
(1) A: How did Mary do in her exams? 
B: She passed some of them. 
=> Mary passed some but not all of the exams. 
(2) Dinner is spaghetti bolognaise or lasagne. 
=> Dinner is not both spaghetti bolognaise and lasagne. 
In (1), the listener could infer that Mary passed some but not all of the exams, and in 
(2), that she was allowed one but not both of the meals, even though this information was 
not explicitly present in the basic meaning of the utterance. According to Horn [5] and many 
subsequent authors, scalar implicatures arise because of linguistic scales that order lexical 
terms (e.g., <some, all>, <or, and>) with respect to the strength of the information they 
convey. Thus when a speaker uses a weak expression, such as some, the listener can infer 
that the stronger meaning of the sentence is not true. In (1), for example, the all proposition 
is negated, and in (2), the and proposition is negated. Scalar implicatures are a ubiquitous 
phenomenon that are sensitive to pragmatic factors, such as the knowledge of the speaker, 
but also semantic structure, such as downward entailment contexts. They are therefore ideal 
phenomena with which to investigate how semantics and pragmatics interact, and moreover, 
how Gricean pragmatics can be incorporated into processing theories [6-10].  
 In our study we investigate how scalar implicatures can be primed. We build on work 
that demonstrated priming of quantifiers, numerals, and ad hoc scalar implicatures [5,6]. Bott 
and Chemla [6] used a sentence-to-picture matching task where participants matched a 
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sentence to one of two pictures. The sentence-picture combination was such that in some 
prime trials participants were obliged to derive an enriched interpretation of the sentence in 
order to select the correct picture and in other primes no enrichment was required. In the 
target trials the sentence-picture combination could be interpreted sensibly with or without 
enrichment and thus provided participants with the choice of interpretation. Participants were 
more likely to derive the enrichment in the target trial if the prime trial required an 
enrichment. Bott and Chemla [6] suggested that the effect could have arisen from processes 
tied to the lexicon, similar to standard polysemy, or the priming of more abstract processes 
stored independently from the lexicon, much like the abstract syntactic representations 
argued for by Branigan and Pickering [11] and others to explain syntactic priming. In this 
study we use electrophysiology to test which account best explains their findings.  
No ERP studies on pragmatic priming have been conducted but research has found 
neural correlates for structural priming. Research using ERPs in syntactic priming have 
found that two components are particularly important, the N400 and the P600. These effects 
are considered to reflect general cognitive mechanisms: the N400 (and negativities more 
generally) has been associated with predictive coding triggered by mismatches between top-
down and bottom-up information and the P600 with shifts to an appropriate response and 
updating of mental representations [12-14]. In the following, however, we restrict the 
literature review to studies using priming. Reductions in the N400 amplitude are typically 
associated with processes that arise from meaning related expectations [15,16]. In the 
context of priming studies, the N400 is considered as a marker of prediction [17]. Reduced 
N400s are seen for predictable words and when a related word was present in the preceding 
context [18-20].  When an incongruent word was made predictable the N400 was eliminated 
[17]. Furthermore, Ledoux et al. [20] found a reduction in N400 amplitude in a structural 
priming task when a word was repeated. Thus, if structural priming involves priming of lexical 
meaning, then, a reduced N400 would be expected.  
The other relevant ERP signature is the P600 [20,21]. If priming involves the alignment 
of procedures used to derive particular structures, differences across conditions in the P600 
might be observed in priming studies. Two studies find support for this idea. In addition to 
N400 effects for verb repetition, Ledoux et al. [20] found that the repetition of sentence 
structure (reduced relative clause or main clause) led to a decrease in the amplitude of the 
P600, as did Tooley and colleagues [21] in a follow-up study. One way to interpret the P600 
is that access to an abstract representation facilitates processing of a similar structure. That 
is, the mental model makes available certain representations or there are mechanisms that 
generate the implicature. This contrasts with a lexical explanation. 
 5 
 
These ERP results are evidence for discrete neural correlates of the processing 
facilitation afforded by priming. In this paper we use the N400 and P600 as markers of the 
underlying process taking place in pragmatic priming. 
The present study combines pragmatic priming with ERPs to investigate the priming 
effects found in behavioural data. Participants completed a picture-sentence matching task. 
They were presented with a sentence followed by a picture and had to decide whether the 
picture matched the sentence (see Fig.1.). There were prime trials and target trials. The 
prime trials were either strong or weak depending on the picture configuration (Fig.2). In 
strong trials the picture supported an enriched interpretation of the sentence (e.g., some but 
not all) whereas in weak trials the picture was consistent with an unenriched interpretation 
(e.g., some and possibly all). Target trials followed prime trials and were always strong trials 
(unlike Bott & Chemla [6], in which target trials always contained a weak picture). In all other 
respects target trials were identical in structure to prime trials.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example trial sequence. True colours were white letters on a grey background. 
 
We expected facilitation on the (strong) target trials when they were preceded by a 
strong prime. If priming of enrichment is linked to meaning related expectations, we should 
observe a lower N400 amplitude in the strong prime relative to the weak prime condition, as 
in priming studies of polysemy and repeated word effects in structural priming [20,22]. If 
priming of enrichment is related to more abstract representations, we should observe a 
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reduced P600 in the strong prime condition, either because less reanalysis of the mental 
representation occurs relative to the weak condition, as in previous abstract structural 
priming studies [20,21], or because the implicature derivation mechanisms themselves have 
been primed and so require less processing effort to execute. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two native German speakers were recruited from the University of Cologne. All 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight and gave written informed consent. Seven 
had to be excluded from the analysis because of extensive ocular artefacts. Consequently 
25 participants (6 male, mean age 22.08 years) were included in the analysis, who had on 
average 30 trials remaining per condition after artefact rejection.  
Materials 
Each trial involved a sentence followed by a verification picture. Two categories of 
expression were used: quantifiers and disjunctions. Fig.2 shows examples of the pictures 
used. For quantifier trials the sentence frame was “Some of the letters are [letter]” (e.g., 
“Einige der Buchstaben sind Ts.”). The pictures contained 9 letters. In strong trials the nine 
letters consisted of six letters that matched the predicate (i.e., “T”) and three that did not (see 
Fig.2, top left). In weak trials all nine letters matched the predicate (see Fig.2, top right). For 
disjunction trials, the sentence frame was “There is a [letter] or a [letter]” (e.g., “Es gibt ein A 
oder ein H.”). In strong trials the picture contained one letter that had been mentioned in the 
predicate (Fig.2, bottom left). In weak trials the picture contained two letters that matched the 
predicate (Fig.2, bottom right). Prime trials included the strong or weak picture respectively, 
and target trials included the strong picture.  
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Figure 2. Example stimuli. Top left to right: Quantifier strong, weak for “Some of the letters are Ts.” 
Bottom left to right: Disjunction strong, weak for “There is an A or a H.” True colours were white 
letters on grey background. 
Design 
There were two sorts of expressions, quantifier or disjunction, which could be 
combined with a strong picture or a weak picture to form primes, or a strong picture to form 
targets. Thus there were four categories of prime-target trial pairs (quantifiers: strong-> 
strong, weak->strong; disjunctions: strong->strong, weak->strong). For each category, there 
were 40 prime-target pairs, resulting in 160 experimental pairs overall (= 320 trials). There 
were also filler trials to obscure the experimental structure and cause participants to vary 
their response. There were 160 weak filler trials (80 quantifier, 80 disjunction) that required a 
positive response (sentence-picture match) and 200 filler trials (50 weak quantifier, 50 strong 
quantifier, 50 weak disjunction, 50 strong disjunction) that required a negative response 
(sentence-picture non-match). For negative filler trials, the visually presented letters did not 
match the predicate. In total there were 680 trials.  
One filler trial occurred before each experimental prime-target pair. The remaining filler 
trials occurred at random positions. Experimental pairs were presented in a different random 
order for each participant.  
Procedure 
Prior to the experimental session participants took part in a practice session, which 
comprised of eight trials. This allowed participants to become familiar with the task. 
A trial began with the presentation of a fixation point for 500ms. Then the sentence 
was presented either in three chunks for quantifiers “Einige der Buchstaben | sind | [letter]” 
or two chunks for disjunctions “Es gibt | ein [letter] oder ein [letter].” Chunks were presented 
for 450ms with an interchunk interval of 150ms; the sentence-final chunk for disjunction was 
presented for 550ms. After 500ms the picture was presented for 1000ms followed by the 
presentation of a question mark. Participants were asked to indicate whether each picture 
matched the previous sentence and they were told to hold their response until the question 
mark appeared. The question mark remained until participants responded or 2000ms had 
passed (see Fig.1). 
EEG recording & data processing 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 32 scalp electrodes mounted on 
the scalp by an elastic cap (Easycap), which conformed to the standard 10-20 system for 
electrode positioning. The EEG was digitised at a rate of 500Hz and amplified by a Brain 
Vision Brain-Amp amplifier (impedances <4kΩ). The EEG was referenced online to the left 
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mastoid and re-referenced offline to linked mastoids (ground: AFz). To control for eye-
movement artefacts, we placed three electrodes around the participant’s right eye and one 
electrode at the outer cantus of the left eye.  
To avoid slow signal drifts, the data were processed offline with a 0.3-20Hz bandpass 
filter. Automatic (±40μV at ocular electrodes) and manual rejections were performed to 
exclude trials that contained ocular or other artifacts prior to averaging (23.8%). ERPs were 
time-locked to the onset of the picture and average ERPs were calculated per condition and 
participant before grand averages were computed over all participants. The critical time 
windows were determined by first running analyses over 50ms windows from picture onset 
until 900ms thereafter in order to determine intervals spanning at least 100ms. ANOVAs for 
mean amplitude values were computed with prime type and ROI (topographical region of 
interest) as factors and for lateral and midline channels separately. The lateral electrodes 
were grouped by location as follows: left anterior (F7/F3/FC5/FC1/C3), right anterior 
(F4/F8/FC2/FC6/C4), left posterior (T7/CP5/CP1/P7/P3), and right posterior 
(T8/CP2/CP6/P4/P8). The six electrodes from the midline were grouped anterior 
(Fz/FCz/Cz) and posterior (CPz/Pz/POz). This data is available at https://osf.io/qfwrg/. 
Results 
Behavioural data 
 Participants responded with a button press indicating whether the sentence matched 
the picture. For experimental trials, participants responded overwhelmingly with “match” 
(99.8% responses to primes and 99.7% responses to targets). For the filler items that were 
designed such that the sentence and picture did not match, participants responded 100% of 
the time with “non-match”. Thus, participants were not sticking with one response throughout 
the experiment. Consequently, we interpret the responses to target trials as reflecting 
implicature interpretations. 
EEG data 
We analysed data from target trials. Based on successive 50ms window analyses, we 
determined effect windows of at least 100ms length and examined the grand average ERPs 
in the windows 400-600ms and 600-700ms for the quantifier contrast. Fig.3 indicates 
facilitation through priming for quantifiers: after strong prime trials there is a reduced 
positivity in the 400-600ms window, which extends to the 600-700ms over right posterior 
electrodes. No other differences between the quantifier conditions emerge. No effect of 
prime type is observable for disjunction. 
We ran separate ANOVAs for each expression type (corrected for sphericity violations 
using the Huynh-Feldt procedure [23]). In quantifiers between 400-600ms we observed an 
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interaction of prime and ROI [F(3,72)=6.07, p<.003] and a main effect of prime 
[F(1,24)=30.70, p<.001]. The effect of prime was significant for all ROIs [F’s(1,24)>6.21, p’s 
<.02]. For the midline electrodes, quantifiers revealed a main effect of prime [F(1,24)=23.07, 
p<.001].  The analysis between 600-700ms registered an interaction of prime and ROI 
[F(3,72)=5.87, p<.002]. Resolution of this interaction by ROI showed an effect of prime over 
right posterior sites [F(1,24)=10.34, p<.004]. No effect emerged over midline electrodes. 
Surprisingly, there was no effect for disjunctions over lateral and midline regions [all 
F’s <3.8, p’s >.05]. We used Bayes factors to interpret the non-significant findings [24]. 
Bayes factors using the JZS prior were <.33 (0.19 and 0.21 respectively) which indicates 
“substantial” evidence in favour of the null hypothesis [25].  
 
Figure 3. Grand mean averages time locked to picture onset. Left panel shows waveforms for 
quantifiers and right panel shows disjunctions. Negative polarity is plotted upwards. Arrow marks 
difference between weak and strong prime condition. An 8Hz low pass filter was applied for plots 
only. 
Discussion 
This experiment investigated the neural response to priming scalar implicatures. We 
tested two types of scalar implicatures, quantifiers and disjunction. For quantifiers, we 
observed facilitatory effects on a positive deflection around 400-600ms, which was less 
pronounced following priming. We take this effect to be part of the P300/P600 family. This 
suggests that the underlying cause of the priming observed in previous behavioural research 
[6] involved priming of the initial structure building mechanisms or the reanalysis procedures. 
It further extends the findings on syntactic priming [11,20,21], suggesting that the underlying 
process is not specific to syntactic structures. Interestingly, we did not observe the same 
effects for disjunctions.  
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One potential concern with our findings is that participants responded with “match” to 
strong target trials regardless of whether the prime was strong or weak, unlike Bott & 
Chemla [6] and others in which behavioural responses altered as a function of the prime. 
Does this mean that there were no priming effects? We argue that the ERP data is evidence 
of a priming effect. Indeed, the absence of differential behavioural responses across prime 
conditions is consistent with our aims. We wished to create a paradigm in which the prime 
would alter the ease with which the interpretation was derived but not the final interpretation 
itself. Differential responding across prime conditions (e.g. 90% “match” responses in one 
condition, 50% in the other) would render the ERP differences difficult to interpret, as would 
the different verification strategies that would be required for different interpretations (e.g. a 
quick and simple existential search for some-and-possibly-all interpretations, a slow and 
complex, two stage search for some-but-not-all interpretations). Consistent with this aim, we 
chose the strong image to be the target, which created an unambiguous sentence-picture 
pairing ([6] observed that participants overwhelmingly selected the implicature interpretation 
when given the choice between an implicature and a literal meaning), and so would be 
difficult for the prime to influence.  
The quantifier conditions demonstrate an early positivity that is less pronounced 
following a strong-strong priming sequence than following a weak-strong sequence. This 
reduced positivity following strong primes reflects facilitation; a larger positivity is indicative 
of an increase in processing effort. This is consistent with studies investigating syntactic 
priming that showed a reduced P600 in target trials when preceded by the same type of trial 
in a prime [20,21]. The observed effect differs partially from the P600 seen in previous 
studies on structural priming because it shows an earlier onset latency (see also [20] for 
early effects). This is likely due to differences in the tasks. Previous priming studies reported 
ERPs time-locked to a particular word. In the present study, however, the ERPs were time-
locked to the picture. At this point the sentence has already been processed and 
expectations have been generated for the upcoming picture, which may result in a latency 
advantage. Note that previous research that used pictures as stimuli in sentence-picture 
verification and comprehension tasks yielded the same processing patterns as observed 
with linguistic stimuli [26-28]. For instance, Lüdtke and colleagues [26] studied negation in a 
sentence picture matching paradigm (“a ghost” vs. “no ghost”) and found N400 and late 
positivity effects on the picture, where the former reflected the matching of noun and picture 
(e.g., presence of ghost) and the latter the derivation of the negation. Moreover, the P600 is 
considered part of the P300 family [29-30], which is elicited by unexpected stimuli, reflects 
context updating, and critically shows varying latency. The observed effect is thus taken to 
reflect the mechanisms underlying priming during implicature processing. 
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We have argued that the P600 effect that we observed correspond to either priming of 
the procedures used to derive the implicature or to a reanalysis of the initial interpretation. 
Which of these turn out to be correct depends partly on when participants are assumed to 
derive the implicature. If they commit to a fully-fledged implicature interpretation while 
reading the sentence, i.e. prior to the onset of the image, the P600 effect likely relates to 
structural reanalysis. Conversely, if implicature commitment is delayed until the onset of the 
image, the P600 could reflect the derivation process itself. There is no immediate way of 
distinguishing these accounts with our data but previous studies using paradigms similar to 
our own suggest that participants delay responding. Behavioural sentence verification tasks 
[31,32] find response time effects at the end of the sentence, long after reading the scalar 
expression (for an overview see [10]). This is also supported by additional analyses in the 
regions that contain the scalar expression in the current study (see https://osf.io/qfwrg/). 
While some reading time studies have found effects on the quantifier [10], these effects are 
small and have been difficult to replicate, and effects are larger in subsequent sentences 
even for studies that find effects on the quantifier. Moreover, in a sentence verification 
paradigm in which both strong and weak interpretations are used and few contextual cues 
are available, it is more cost-effective to delay commitment to the implicature until the 
verification predicate (the image), as in “good enough” processing [33], because of the 
reanalysis costs of choosing the incorrect image (the same is not true in contexts where the 
context heavily constrains the interpretation, such as the visual world studies of [34] and 
[35]).  
A reanalysis explanation comes in several forms. One version is that the P600 reflects 
abstract linguistic processes involved in the rejection of the weak interpretation and the 
subsequent derivation of the strong interpretation. Another is that the P600 reflects different 
verification strategies. The weak prime condition requires participants to first verify that a 
weak interpretation holds, reject that interpretation, and then verify whether a strong 
interpretation holds, whereas the strong prime condition requires only that the strong 
interpretation be derived and verified. The difference between these reanalysis accounts is 
that the former assumes a linguistic basis for the effects whereas the latter assumes a 
strategic, or verification, basis. However, it is extremely difficult to distinguish between the 
two because all language involves verification of some kind, whether it is against a visual 
image, as in our study, or a cognitive representation, as in more abstract discourse. An 
added complication in this case is that the strong interpretation formally requires that the 
weak interpretation be verified (the strong interpretation entails the weak), hence the 
verification strategies for weak and strong interpretations require many of the same 
processes.  
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Priming of the initial procedures and the reanalysis account are both functional 
explanations that can be accounted for within a domain-general approach [12-14]. This 
views the P600 as a cortical response to incoming information that yields reorienting or 
updating of mental representations. Our data are thus not specific to scalar inferencing. 
Crucially, they indicate that the observed facilitation reflects ease of updating and 
(re)orienting rather than predictive coding. 
The data revealed a distinction between quantifiers and disjunctions. For quantifiers 
we observed a robust effect of priming but for disjunctions we did not (note that the Bayes 
Factors for the disjunction analysis shows that the absence of an effect was not due to 
general insensitivity of the experiment). While the data does not provide an unambiguous 
explanation for the absence of an effect, we can make several suggestions. Most 
interestingly, it is possible that the exclusive disjunction interpretation is not derived via a 
scalar implicature from the inclusive interpretation, contrary to the accepted norm [36]. 
Indeed, some authors have argued, on theoretical grounds, against exclusive disjunction 
being a conversational implicature [37,38]. This mirrors other work suggesting that so called 
free-choice inferences associated with disjunctions are also not computed with (second-
order) scalar implicatures [39-41]. Another possibility is that the exclusive interpretation is 
extremely simple to derive given the visual context. If so, the strong prime would have no 
facilitatory effect on the target interpretation (priming effects are generally weak when 
structures are common and hence easy to retrieve; see [2]).  
Overall the current study indicates that the neural mechanisms underlying pragmatic 
priming with quantifiers can be dissociated from lexically-based alignment. The observed 
positivity effect suggests that abstract derivation processes are primed, either through 
facilitation of initial processes or reanalysis. This mirrors alignment effects of sentence 
structures that have also given rise to positive deflections. It thus points towards a common 
neural basis underlying pragmatic and syntactic alignment.  
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Figure 1. Example trial sequence. True colours were white letters on a grey background. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example stimuli. Top left to right: Quantifier strong, weak for “Some of the letters are Ts.” 
Bottom left to right: Disjunction strong, weak for “There is an A or a H.” True colours were white 
letters on grey background. 
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Figure 3. Grand mean averages time locked to picture onset. Left panel shows waveforms for 
quantifiers and right panel shows disjunctions. Negative polarity is plotted upwards. Arrow marks 
difference between weak and strong prime condition. 
 
 
